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IN RF: 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
C. DEMONT JUDD 
C. DEMONT ,JUDD, by and through his attorney of record, 
LORIN N. PACE, appeals from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Recommendations as follows: 
Appellant disagrees with the Findings of Fact entered 
by the Commission and believes that they should read as follows 
in order to reflect the testimony given. (New material which 
differs from Commission findings is marked with an asterisk). 
COUNT I 
1. That on or about November, 1978, Respondent, C. 
DeMont Judd, Jr. undertook to represent Barbara Hennefer in a 
misdemeanor criminal matter in Ogden, Utah. The trial was held 
on January 5, 197Q. 
*2. Respondent held initial discussions with Ms. 
Jk•nnc·f,•r ancl asked her to submit a written summary of the facts. 
Pc'''l'"nc:lrnt •1uestioned Ms. Hennefer and the prosecutor questioned 
Ms. Hennefcer (R. 10 and 11, December 6 Record). Ms. Hennefer 
stated that she did not feel she was able to tell her story 
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i fl. l 1) , but was unable to say why. Under question from 
fic·,,r,onde>nt's counsel, Ms. Hennefer could not say what it was 
that she did not have a chance to explain (R. 33-34). 
The fact that Mr. Judd answered twenty (20) minutes late 
i,-, de m1nimus and should be stricken. In undisputed testimony, 
Mr. stated that he had appeared earlier in court, talked 
to counsel, advised that he was handling another matter else-
where in the same court. When he returned, the case was tried. 
Judd stated he had the facts in mind (R. 37-December 7), 
and he had the written reserve (R. 40-December 7). A recess was 
had and Respondent conferred with his client (R. 42-December 7). 
3. The Court found Ms. Hennefer guilty of the charge 
whereupon Respondent subsequently agreed to pursue an appeal 
on behalf of Ms. Hennefer to the District Court. Ms. Hennefer 
paid and Respondent accepted a fee of one hundred dollars to 
undertake said appeal. 
4. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal to the District 
Court but thereafter, failed to perfect said appeal. Respondent 
failed to file a memorandum of authorities as provided in the 
court rules and after having been advised to do so by the court, 
fail0d to appear at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the 
cqmea 1 filed by the prosecution. This hearing was held on 
'lf·ril JG, 1979 regarding said appeal and Ms. Hennefer's appeal 
1:/.1'; (lismissed. 
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5. Respondent did not advise Barbara Hennefer that her 
If'! ,•,1 l had b0en dismissed, and said Barbara Henne fer was 
informed of this fact through communication with the court. 
However, Respondent testified that he did not know of the 
adv0rse decision and that he thus could not have advised Ms. 
Hennefer that the appeal had been dismissed. 
6. On or about May 9, 1979, Respondent and said 
Barbara Hennefer had a conference discussing the status of the 
appea 1. At that conference, Respondent gave to Barbara Hennefer 
a check evidencing a refund of Ms. Hennefer's fee of $100, 
which check contained a restrictive endorsement theron which 
pur1>orted to release Respondent from any liability to his 
client Barbara Hennefer. Ms. Hennefer accepted said check but 
did not cash or negotiate said check. 
7. Ms. Hennefer was not damaged by any of the above. 
Mr. Johnson testified that he thought Mr. Judd had done a fine 
]Ob representing Ms. Hennefer (R. 15-December 7) and that 
except for a mistrial request that an appeal would have made no 
di ffcrr;nce (R. 17-18). 
COUNT II 
1. That Respondent undertook to represent one Rose Ann 
•:r ... ,,- Anderson in an annulment proceeding in November, 1979. 
2. Rose Ann Grover Anderson, after the filing of her 
'-.,rn1 I ,1 int by Respondent, moved to Chula Vista, California in 
t-J•JV«mh•'r of 1979. 
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3. A trial date of April 17, 1980 was set for the trial 
ul tl1i,; matter by the District Court. At said trial, the 
DefPndant and his counsel were present. The Plaintiff, Rose 
Ann Grover Anderson and Respondent, C. DeMont Judd, Jr. were not 
present. Respondent had made contact with the court and had 
received assurances that the case would not be tried on the 17th 
of Apri 1. 
* 4. 
This is uncontroverted. 
The Respondent, having knowledge of the said trial 
date, undertook representation of another client and appeared 
at a deposition in Provo, Utah, believing that his calendar 
was clear (R. 61 and 64). 
*5. While it is true that Respondent did not notify his 
client of the trial date, he did have a discussion with her that 
he would let her know if the case was to be tried. He believed 
it would not be tried and thus gave no notice (R. 60, 65 and 94). 
6. As a result of said trial, a Decree of Annulment 
was entered which included terms adverse to those for which Rose 
Ann Grover Anderson had requested that Mr. Judd present to the 
court. However, the decree was not adverse to the facts nor 
was it adverse in the opinion of Respondent and Mr. Timothy 
Blackham (R. 26 and 78). 
Further, the complaint was countersigned by Rose Ann 
r:"v•'r Anderson (Exhibit 4). 
*Further, consistent with the facts presented, the deci-
sion of the court was better than could be obtained by additional 
'""1rt proct>edinqs (R. 26 and 78). 
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*Rose Ann Grover Anderson did not request either that 
the· decree be set aside nor did she request an appeal. She 
preferred to file a complaint with the Bar (R. 78). 
Rose Ann Grover Anderson was a sophisticated, knowledge-
able person (R. 101). She acted in a less-than-honorable 
manner in the following particulars: 
(a) She did not want her husband to know that 
she was pregnant. (She sought to keep this fact out 
of the complaint [R. 78]). 
(b) After receiving a Restraining Order and 
Order to Show Cause seeking to restrain her from 
leaving the state, she nevertheless left the state 
with $3,800.00 and the 1979 Toyota automobile (R. 58). 
(c) She wanted $10,000 as child support settle-
ment but did not want her husband to know that she 
was bearing his baby (R. 78) . 
(d) She has to this day refused to honor the 
order and decree of the court. 
*Rose Ann Grover Anderson could have mitigated her damages 
by allowing counsel to move to set aside the decree. 
COUNT III 
Based upon the foregoing, the only charges which can 
,,,,,,c;on<Jhly be made and sustained are: 
l. That Respondent C. DeMont Judd failed to perfect an 
ap1•cul on behalf of his client, Barbara Hennefer, in violation 
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,>( l>Hl-102 A (6) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct 
"[ t)w Utah State Bar; and 
2. That Respondent attempted to exonerate himself from 
liability to his client in violation of DR6-101 A (2). 
Respondent submits that the testimony of Rose Ann Grover 
Anderson is not credible and that count ought to be dismissed. 
All matters in the counts addressed to the Respondent, 
arose while Case No. 16938 was under consideration either by 
the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar or by the Supreme Court. 
No complaint has subsequently been filed which has not been 
disposed of. 
When asked by counsel about whether he was concerned 
about the matters referred to in this complaint, the response 
was as follows: 
Q. Mr. Judd, you recognize, I take it, that 
there was probably some failure in perfecting the 
appeal, according to the rules that the Court was 
interpreting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how do you feel about that? 
A. I feel very bad about that, very bad. 
Q. If you had this process to do over again, 
what would your intentions be? 
A. Well, I suopose the priorities would have 
to be rearranged, and I suppose that I would neglect 
my Plected duty and be the lawyer. And that's the 
difficulty. 
-7-
Q. You have had cause recently, have you not, 
to be much more aware of the Rules of Ethics of 
the State Bar Association, have you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And could you tell me whether or not these 
are very much in the forefront of your thinking, or 
not in the forefront of your thinking? 
A. very much. 
Q. This has become a real concern to you, has it? 
A. It's a specter that hangs over my head day 
and night. 
Q. Do you think that under similar circumstances 
with Mrs. Hennefer, that you could handle it, if the 
same circumstances were presented to you today, in 
such a way that even the filing of a complaint could 
be eliminated? 
A. I would hope so. 
No dama0e was done to either complaining witness and that there 
is no showing of moral turpitude. 
Respondent became involved in these matters while the 
previous case was under appeal and he is most conscious of his 
responsibility as a lawyer. Accordingly, the Proposal 1 merits 
""spension and should be reduced to a reprimand. 
L I N. PACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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